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The production and use of knowledge (understood as making sense of information) are key 
issues in governing complex education systems. In current discourses, these relationships 
have been coined as ‘evidence-based’ or ‘evidence-informed’ practices and/or policies. Here, 
the author reflects on some contradictions or paradoxes that are inherent in these discourses, 
based on his experience of efforts to decentralise the very complex centralised and federalist 
education structure in Austria. In this structure, the political attempts to strengthen ‘evidence’ 
are strongly contested. A recently-created state institute collects information and produces 
evidence on school performance, based on a system of externally-defined and regularly- 
measured educational standards in literacy, numeracy and foreign language at grades 4 and 8 
and a new partially standardised ‘maturity’ examination for entrance to higher education. 
This approach of knowledge production is contested by teachers’ unions, regularly decried in 
the public media, rejected by influential intellectuals, and viewed with much scepticism by 
teachers. There are concerns that the practical pedagogy will be disturbed and resources 
diverted from real needs. In the competing camp, advocates of research-based approaches set 
high expectations for the production of evidence, although frequently forgetting that evidence 
also needs an ideological underpinning.
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Why do some object so strongly to attempts to strengthen research knowledge production and 
others overestimate its impact? The explanation may lie in the governance structure. On the 
one hand, there are challenges of complexity in the education system. On the other, policy 
makers and researchers do not address these challenges in an appropriate manner. Here, we 
may recall some well-established conceptions of complexity which have sometimes been 
forgotten in contemporary discourses (Weick, 1976, Meyer & Rowan, 1977). Two 
relationships are highlighted: first, between organisational governance structures and the 
patterns of information and knowledge production, and second, between different 
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understandings of complexity and approaches to governance and the use of evidence. The 
two key tensions of contemporary policy discourses, between input and output/outcome 
orientation, and between centralised and decentralised governance structures and transitions 
from one to the other are at the centre of the argument.  
 
Information, Knowledge and Governance Structures  
 
A basic contention is that flows of information and their transformation into knowledge are to 
some extent automatically embedded in the day-to-day practices of certain structural 
arrangements and shaped by them.
3
 Governance or governing always display practices of 
their own that somehow try to intervene in the basic day-to-day practices and thus must take 
into account the ongoing flows of information and knowledge, as they create their own 
knowledge. In terms of governance, a simplified distinction can be made between flows of 
first-order information and knowledge used in daily operations and higher-order information 
and knowledge needed to intervene at the practice level. In multi-level governance structures, 
the flows of information and their transformation into knowledge also take place at different 
levels. Depending on the governance structures, these chains of observations are typically not 
symmetric but, as generalised by systems-theory, hierarchical patterns, with the higher levels 
observing the subordinate ones and formal research also playing a role in these chains of 
observation.  
Conventionally, knowledge is perceived as an instrument of control in governance. The 
actors must know how to perform their duties and practices, and, to a certain extent, this 
knowledge is formalised. It is assumed that deeper knowledge leads to better performance 
and that the more you know the more power you have to control. But lack of knowledge leads 
to performance problems. This issue is more or less implicitly included in the current mantra 
of the shift from input- to output-oriented management or policies, which, in turn, is closely 
related to the shift from centralised to decentralised governance. In the traditional type of 
centralised bureaucratic governance, knowledge and information are tightly embedded in the 
organisational forms, processes are prescribed, and outputs are assumed to follow 
automatically from the prescriptions. If you know these, you know how the system works (or 
should work) and what the outputs will be (thus, if you want to change the outputs, you only 
must change the inputs). The structure is assumed to work like a kind of machine. If you 
know how it works you can use it because it has its inherent logic.  
 
                                                 
3
 See the seminal work by Arthur Stinchcombe (1990). 
3 
 
Understandings of Complexity and their Relationship to Politics and Policy  
 
Here, a key issue comes into play. Different understandings of complexity have important 
consequences for the use and production of evidence. Complexity is often understood as a 
machine which becomes more complicated. More and better information and knowledge are 
necessary to understand its functioning. However, the basic machine metaphor is left intact. 
Versions of decentralisation can be understood in this way. The various actors are granted 
more discretion. Hence, outputs no longer automatically follow from inputs. Clear 
information about outputs must be gathered and analysed. From the perspective of knowledge 
production, the machine metaphor is very good because it helps to relate the information 
about the outputs to the inputs and processes and analyse their interrelations. This depiction 
may seem like a caricature. However, it still occurs much more frequently than could be 
expected.  
Various versions of organisation theory and research show that the machine metaphor does 
not really work in social organisation. In an alternative understanding, complexity refers to 
unpredictability (and, as was shown a century ago, an unpredictable system is not necessarily 
very complicated). This alternative understanding expresses not only a quantitative increase 
in complication (e.g. in terms of the number of influential variables and/or actors involved or 
units of activity which need to be understood and controlled by a corresponding increase in 
information), but also a distinction between different qualities of predictability and potential 
to control, which the actors tend to negate (a basic feature of these different qualities is 
whether the cause of uncertainty is only the lack of information about how the complicated 
‘machine’ works, or a kind of ontological unpredictability in the structures of the ongoing 
interactions).
4
 This negation tendency is not very surprising, as unpredictability is difficult to 
handle. This problem is aggravated by the fact that empirical representations of the machine 
version of complexity and its alternative are not easy to distinguish: it is possible to believe 
that some unidentified causal factors or relationships could produce an outcome and thus rule 
out the possibility that some (idiosyncratic or ‘chaotic’) random processes might be at work.  
The different school structures in the regional jurisdictions of the Austrian federal structure 
are an example of this. The actors in the various regional structures explain their differences 
‘rationally’ (which are also represented by crude information only). Even if the existing 
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information cannot prove the ‘rational-policy’hypothesis, the actors prefer to believe in it (the 
machine understanding) because an alternative hypothesis of erratic differences produced by 
more or less random non-rational situations in the complex structure (the uncertainty 
understanding) would question the rationality of the existing governance. Even if this 
alternative hypothesis is true, the question arises as to whether it might be ‘proven’ with finite 
information.  
Two versions of the machine-understanding are particularly important in relation to 
‘evidence-based policy and practice’. One is that policy makers tend to con- trol their field, 
thus the epistemological simplification of the machine metaphor makes politics simple, at 
least at first sight. Guy Peters formulated this problem in epigrammatic form. He 
characterised the institutional garbage-can model of a loose coupling of problems and 
solutions as:  
 
“Good Description of Reality,  
Less Good Normative Model  
But Recognizes boundaries of Rational Policymaking”. (Peters, 2011, slide 12)  
 
The second representation is the educational production function and its various versions by 
economists, first based on national data and then on data of the international large-scale 
assessments. They analyse the contributions of variables or patterns of variables to outputs 
and assert that the results are the only ‘real’ evidence. They seem not only to follow 
implicitly the machine metaphor, but also to forget that their models, which integrate several 
countries, create a universal super-machine which only exists at the virtual level. The 




Both representations reinforce the search for a better understanding of the functioning of the 
machine. However, the basic force in this path of knowledge production runs diametrically 
counter to unpredictability. Even if we concede that we can only explain a small part of the 
whole, and that in the relationship between the known and the unknown the latter is always 
bigger, we still tend to overstate what is known and ignore, or at least downplay, what we do 
not (we can see this as a primitive version of ‘positivism’).  
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Consequences for the Production of Evidence  
 
If we now turn to the consequences for the production and use of knowledge, we must look at 
the relationships between the traditional centralised bureaucracy and the new decentralised 
forms on the one hand, and the machine-version and the uncertainty version on the other. 
Their implications for the production of information and knowledge can be summarised as 
follows:  
 
1. The story that decentralised governance is related to greater complexity, or that complexity 
arises from new governance forms is misleading. The interpretations of complexity above 
must be taken into account: (i) the various actors and stakeholders who become more 
formally involved in new governance already played a role in the traditional bureaucracy, 
although more covertly and informally; (ii) the new modes might show an increase in terms 
of (machine) complication, but, in terms of complexity (unpredictability), the traditional 
mode might be even more complex, as the informal influences of various actors impact on 
practices in unpredictable ways (Lassnigg, 2016a).  
 
2. The traditional bureaucracy is both an organisational and an informational structure that 
includes (first order) information flows and knowledge in its prescriptions (Stinchcombe, 
1990). Higher order information and knowledge on daily functioning are rather unwelcome at 
the practice level. They are seen as knowledge for control and domination, and tend to 
compete with practitioners’ embedded knowledge. There is a twofold problem in this 
structure which is reflected in the teachers’ resistance to it and in policy makers’ attempt to 
control it. In a centralised system such as in Austria, we observe that policy makers take a 
huge amount of formal responsibility for the performance of schools, but blame practitioners 
when it comes to problems.
6
 Two important expectations can be stated here: first, the quality 
of the firstorder embedded knowledge at the practice level greatly depends on the governance 
structure and the status it gives to the teachers (which vary according to the degree of 
centralisation); second, policies resting on professional approaches will better integrate 
research-based knowledge with practitioners’ embedded knowledge.7 
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3. The break-up of bureaucratic lines in new modes of governance leads to break-ups in 
information and knowledge flows embedded in the prescriptive input-led governance 
structures. They need to be bridged by new forms of knowledge production, particularly 
assessments of student learning and their feedback into the processes. Hence, decentralised 
governance structures need new institutes that carry out assessments and broker information 
between the various players. However, if the new production of information is based on the 
machine metaphor of technical-functional rationalisation and the understanding of 
complexity in the sense of complication, its basic mission is to reduce and ideally rule out 
unpredictability as far as possible; thus, these arrangements will work against a potential 
understanding of complexity in the sense of unpredictability.  
 
4. The approaches of ‘evidence-based policy and practice’ and the discourses about research 
epistemology and ontology are closely linked to the understandings of governance and 
complexity. Evidence as advocated by economists means selective and sophisticated causal 
knowledge that has ruled out unpredictability.
8
 For policy making, this means producing a 
few apparently justified policy prescriptions; complexity obtains a status of obscurity in this 
kind of reasoning and cannot have a similar epistemological status as the hard-won positive 
research results. The basic policy trends sketched above reproduce themselves in research. 
The strong push towards the ‘usefulness’ of research, and an affiliation of institutions to the 
governance structure (e.g. a state institute such as the Austrian BIFIE (www.bifie.at)), or 
dependence on revenues from a single client, reinforce this tendency. A strong and pluralistic 
independent public research infrastructure that gives legitimacy to the critical discourses and 
an open public availability of the information bases could support a more balanced 
production of knowledge.  
 
5. The demand for and promises of ‘evidence-based policy and practice’ do not therefore 
necessarily help to better understand and improve practice. In a traditional centralised and 
bureaucratic governance structure, we can expect research to be little developed, little valued 
and thus little supported. As research starts from a weak foundation and is not adequately 
supported, the research community is not able to provide the evidence that is asked for, and 
this will probably lead to downward spirals in a hostile environment. This assertion can be 
reasonably justified in the Austrian case, where the already small means for policy related 
research have been concentrated at the state-institute and the use of the data acquired is 
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restricted. The politicised use of the evidence produced has deepened the gap between 
research and practice rather than spread the use and understanding of information and 
knowledge (Lassnigg, 2016b). In decentralised structures, ‘evidence-based policy and 
practice’ easily lead to a bias towards high-stakes polices according to the logic of the 
machine model if the alternative version of complexity is not taken into account.  
 
6. One conclusion is that a professional approach to governance that is oriented towards the 
integration of practice and knowledge production at the teaching level can cope better with 
the insecurities involved in complex structures than an ‘evidence-based approach’. The latter 
is based on striving for sophisticated causal technical-instrumental knowledge, that is 
necessarily separated from the work at both the teaching and policy making levels and 
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